This paper studies the impact of China's "Belt and Road Initiative" (BRI) on Chinese firms' outward foreign direct investment (OFDI). Overall, the BRI positively impacts on Chinese OFDI activities. However, both the direction and the magnitude of this impact depend on the host countries' willingness to participate in the BRI. The BRI promotes more OFDI to developing countries that welcome China's economic engagement and alters the effect of Chinese domestic push factors on its OFDI patterns. In addition, Chinese firms in construction and infrastructure, manufacturing, and trade-related sectors are more responsive to the BRI than firms in other sectors.
Introduction
China, as an increasing provider of foreign direct investment (FDI), is increasingly drawing the world's attention (e.g., Qian 2009, Cheng and Ma 2010) . The outward FDI flow from China accelerated to 183 billion USD in 2016 (from 28.6 billion USD in 2003) , officially surpassing the FDI inflow to China and making China a net FDI provider for the first time in history (Figure 1) . The OFDI flow experienced a significant jump in year 2014 (Figure 2 ), in response to the "Belt and Road Initiative" (BRI) proposed by President Xi Jinping in the fall of 2013. Ever since, the BRI has been heavily promoted in China and around the word, with the aim of having profound regional and global impact by promoting economic development and integration across countries (mainly) in Asia, Europe and Africa. 1 There has been a plethora of discussion about the purposes of the BRI (Cheng, 2016; Huang, 2016) . As a long-term national strategy promoted by the Chinese government, some observers describe the initiative as China's new economic strategy aimed at enhancing the economic connection between its domestic market and the global market. 2 Others argue that amid the normalization phase of China's economy, the initiative is mainly proposed to help rebalance China's economic structure and sustain growth by reconfiguring the external sectors and reducing supply-side redundancy (Shen, 2013; . 3 Among the key areas of the BRI, trade and financial integrations (esp. OFDI) are identified as the crucial pillars of the initiatives' economic plan. 4
As an emerging FDI provider, many researchers question whether Chinese firms' investment decisions are driven by domestic policies or economic motives, especially after the launch of the BRI. Some studies, such as Cheung and Qian (2009) , Luo et al. (2010) and , drive Chinese OFDI (esp. under the BRI); 3, the BRI alters the effect of domestic push factors on Chinese OFDI; and 4, the BRI's impact on Chinese OFDI deals differs between SOEs and private enterprises and varies across industries.
To summarize, Chinese OFDI is found to increase substantially after the inception of BRI.
The results indicate that on average, Chinese firms registered approximately 45% more OFDI deals under the BRI than in the previous period. Using a numerical variable to capture the extent of emphasis on the BRI, 5 one percent more promotion of the BRI from the Chinese government is found to be associated with approximately 12% more Chinese OFDI deals in the rest of the world.
In addition, using various definitions of "BRI countries" suggested by prior studies, we find that in general, more OFDI deals are established in BRI countries after 2013. On average, the BRI promotes 36% more Chinese OFDI deals to BRI countries than to non-BRI countries. The increase in OFDI deals is particularly strong in EMDEs that are on the BRI and appear to endorse it.
Domestic push factors, such as overcapacity, GDP growth, exports growth, credit availability, capital controls, and RMB value expectation, are found to affect Chinese OFDI. More importantly, these factors' impacts on Chinese OFDI deals change after the inception of the BRI. While both state-owned and private enterprises invest more abroad after 2013, private enterprises, when making their investment decisions, weigh more on host countries' attitude towards the BRI than SOEs. Finally, the BRI is found to promote Chinese OFDI across all industrial sectors, with firms from construction and infrastructure, manufacturing, and trade-related industry sectors investing substantially more under the BRI than other sectors. The finding is in line with the notion that BRI emphases infrastructure investment and trade promotion across the BRI region.
Our study contributes to the literature in three respects. First, we are among the first cohort of studies to quantitatively assess the policy impact of BRI on Chinese OFDI. Second, while other studies employ aggregate OFDI volume data and ignore the heterogeneity among firms' response to the BRI, our study utilizes firm-level information (e.g., ownership structure and sectoral information) from the unique dataset of OFDI deals approved and registered by MOFCOM. Third, we investigate the plausible domestic economic push factors (e.g., to rebalance economic structure and promote exports) that motivated the Chinese government to propose the BRI and assess whether the BRI attempts to address those issues by promoting OFDI.
The remainder of this paper is arranged as follows. Section 2 reviews the related literature.
Section 3 describes Chinese OFDI data and presents some stylized facts about Chinese OFDI and the BRI. Section 4 describes our empirical strategy, with the main results reported in Section 5.
Section 6 covers further discussion and robustness checks. Section 7 presents the study's conclusions.
Related literature papers
First, this paper is related to a vast literature discussing the economic impact of government policies on FDI. Hartman (1985) finds that domestic tax policy changes strongly affect FDI flows in the U.S. Globerman and Shapiro (1999) use Canadian data from 1950-1995 and find that only general trade policies, such as free trade agreements (FTA and NAFTA), significantly increase the levels of both FDI and OFDI. Some restrictive government policies, such as employment protection and antitrust policies, are identified to reduce both inward FDI and outward FDI (Fournier, 2015) . More related to our study, Cheung and Qian (2009) , Luo et al. (2010) and show that China's "Going Global" policies stimulate Chinese firms to invest abroad.
Second, this paper is related to a group of studies focusing on the BRI policy. For instance, Cheng (2016) discusses the potential objectives of BRI. Is it market-based and economically motivated? Does it target certain countries for economic cooperation? Huang (2016) , while admitting it is too early to assess the impact of the BRI, asserts that the BRI has the potential of turning the underdeveloped BRI region into a vibrant economic corridor. He also highlights the possible barriers that face the BRI, such as the lack of central coordination, the presence of political divergence, and potential financial risks concerning cross-border projects.
In addition to studies that adopt a global perspective, many papers focus on region-specific economic opportunities and challenges linked to the BRI. For example, Herrero and Xu (2017) and Esteban and Li (2017) assess whether Europe will gain from the BRI in terms of trade. Kaczmarski (2017) suggests that the BRI could mutually influence China and Eurasia. Ma et al. (2017) analyse the BRI's effect on the agriculture trade in Central Asia, and Vangeli (2017) explores the economic connection between Central, East and Southeast Europe and China under the influence of the BRI.
Previous studies show that countries differ in their attitude towards the BRI, especially in their willingness to accommodate Chinese OFDI and participate in the BRI. For example, Hofman (2016) explores the impact of the BRI on Tajikistan and suggests that Tajikistan may welcome Chinese farm land investment, which may help develop its agriculture market. From the trade perspective, Fardella and Prodi (2016) argue that railway and port construction under China's BRI poses challenges for Italy, which should coordinate its ports and railway system to cautiously embrace and benefit from the BRI. Huang et al. (2017) use a case study to highlight the environment and social challenges facing Pakistani economy when engaging in the BRI and receiving China's OFDI. They also emphasize Pakistan's positive attitude towards Chinese OFDI and the BRI. Jacob (2017) compares the different views about China's BRI held by India and Pakistan. Kadilar and Erguney (2017) argue that Turkey should refrain from being ambivalent towards the BRI. Kong (2017) points out that Malaysia needs China's industry overcapacity to develop its infrastructure, and Sino-Malaysia relations will be strengthened through the BRI. Spruds (2107) and Timofeev et al. (2017) examine the possible opportunities and challenges associated with China's BRI in Latvia and Russia, respectively. Timofeev et al. (2017) conclude that a successful Sino-Russia economic collaboration under the BRI depends crucially on the future dynamics of the Eurasian integration and an agreement to co-develop the Eurasian Economic Union.
Data and some stylized facts
The empirical analyses of this paper are mainly based on Chinese OFDI deal data obtained from the Ministry of Commerce of the People's Republic of China (MOFCOM). The dataset covers OFDI deals approved by (and registered at) the ministry from 1 January 2000 to the end of 2015. 6 For every OFDI deal, the dataset records the name of the investing firm, its industrial sector, the province of origin, the deal's approval date, the recipient country of the OFDI, and a short description of the investment transaction. However, MOFCOM did not release information on 6 As shown in and MOFCOM (2014), any outward direct investment deal worth more than $100 million was subject to approval by MOFCOM before 6 October 2014. Overseas investment in energy and mining, and projects between $10 million and $100 million needed approval from commerce departments at the provincial level. Companies investing in industries covered by China's export restriction policies or in projects that may affect foreign countries' interests remain subject to MOFCOM's approval (MOFCOM Order [2014 ] No. 3 (Sept. 6, 2014 . The National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) also has the power to approve or veto an overseas investment project. From October 2014, onwards, Chinese companies planning to invest less than $1 billion overseas will only need to register with authorities instead of seeking approval from the NDRC. Any overseas investment project larger than $1 billion must be approved by the NDRC and investments above $2 billion must be approved by the State Council. Details on the evolution of China's regulation on outward foreign direct investment can be found in Stone et al. (2017) and http://fec.mofcom.gov.cn/article/ywzn/dwtz/ (MOFCOM's official website in Chinese). either the investment value of OFDI deals or whether an approved deal is a green-field project or a merger-and-acquisition.
It is also worth noting that MOFCOM only reports the deal's approval date, which is either slightly later or much later than most deals' announcement dates. 7 Additionally, the dataset roughly separates the investing firms according to their ownership structure. It singles out stateowned enterprises controlled by the central government (Central SOEs) from others, without identifying SOEs controlled by other government entities. According to Shen (2013) , who used the same database, most unmarked firms in this dataset are from the private sector. 8 Therefore, this paper cautiously categorizes non-Central SOEs as private enterprises.
To cope with the lack of information on the amount of investment linked to investment deals, we also gathered data on the total OFDI flow from China to individual countries in each year provided by MOFCOM (in millions of USD, termed as "OFDI volume data" in the following sections). The OFDI volume data are used as complements for the deal data and will be utilized in robustness checks. We prefer using the deal data in this paper, since OFDI volume data have two limitations: first, the sectoral or ownership structure information about OFDI is missing; and second, China's OFDI flow data series are inconsistent over the time due to the changes of China's statistical rules in 2003 and 2008. 9 The OFDI deal data include 29,305 firms that made 42,402 OFDI deals (3445 of which were made by central SOEs) that were approved and registered with MOFCOM. It covered 188 host 7 When cross-checking famous investment deals, we find that most of these deals' announcement dates are earlier than their reported approval dates. For instance, according to Reuters (accessed on Feb 7, 2018. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-world-triathlon-m-a-dalian-wanda/chinas-wanda-buys-ironman-triathlon-ownerfor-650-million-idUSKCN0QW04X20150827), Dalian Wanda Group bought the World Triathlon Corp at the end of August 2015, while the deal is approved by MOFCOM in our dataset on 27 October 2015. Another famous example is the Chinese carmaker's (Zhejiang Geely Holding) acquisition of Volvo. The deal was finalized in August 2010 (accessed on Feb 7, 2018, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/03/business/global/03volvo.html) but recorded in the MOFCOM dataset on 23 June 2015. As one of China's largest TV manufacturer, TCL set up a joint venture with French company, Thomson, in Poland in 2003 (accessed on Feb 7, 2018 , http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/en/doc/2003 , but the approval of the deal was granted on 30 December 2014. 8 Since information on ownership is not readily available, Shen (2013) determines firms' ownership structure for 1586 Chinese investment projects by following firms' names and websites and occasionally by making phone calls. However, the same strategy cannot be applied to the large dataset we are using. When the number of investment deals reached 42,402, manually classifying firms will potentially introduce many errors. 9 China used to publish the approved OFDI in the Almanac of China's Foreign Economic Relations &Trade. In 2003, MOFCOM started to report the annual OFDI flow and stock data at The Statistical Bulletin of China's Outward Foreign Direct Investment. However, these data exclude financial OFDI. The Almanan and the Statistical Bulletin have a data discrepancy due to unspecified data rule changes. After 2008, MOFCOM added the financial sector OFDI to the Statistical Bulletin. economies around the globe. 10 Figure 2 shows that both OFDI deals and OFDI volumes have steadily increased since 2013, with a remarkable jump since the announcement of the BRI (i.e., the fall of 2013). By the end of 2015, the number of OFDI deals and aggregate OFDI volume reached 9,907 deals and 145.7 billion USD, respectively, doubling their 2013 levels. The average number of OFDI deals received by EMDEs per year tripled from 745 before the launch of BRI to 2,188 afterwards, while the average annual number of OFDI deals going to AEs went from 1,104 to 5,090 during the same period ( Figure 3 ). The reasons that OFDI deals grew faster in AEs than in EMDEs after the launch of the BRI could be that firms attempt to hedge against Chinese RMB depreciation expectation or favour the market potential and institutional arrangements in AEs (Witt and Lewin, 2007; and Luo et al. 2010 ).
The Chinese government provided the blueprint for the BRI and suggested 65 countries covered in the BRI (termed as "BRC"; see Appendix Table A1 for country names). Meanwhile,
the BRI is open to any other country that wants to participate. As far as we know, none of the officially announced BRI countries is legally obliged to participate in the BRI. In other words, a country's engagement in the BRI depends on its own willingness to participate. For example, while Albania is in the BRC, it did not participate in China's Belt and Road Forum (BRF) 2017 in Beijing, in which state heads or ministers from 57 countries actively participated. We assume these 57 countries endorse the BRI since they actively participated in the BRF hosted in China. We label them as "BRF countries" to distinguish them from other countries. As active BRI forumparticipating countries, BRFs received approximately 70 percent of total OFDI deals in EMDEs and approximately 45 percent in AEs ( Figure 4 ). When focusing on EMDE regions, we find that the East-Asia Pacific region (EAP) received the most OFDI deals (5,134 deals) over the period 2000-2015, followed by Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA, 3,091 deals) and East Central Asia (ECA, 2,887 deals). OFDI deals in ECA and EAP regions mainly went to BRF participants (more than 90 percent of total OFDI deals), especially after the launch of the BRI. Similar patterns are observed when using different classification methods to single out EMDEs that are on the BRI. 11 10 The raw data include investment deals in special territories of China (Hong Kong, China; Macao, China; and Taiwan, China) and offshore financial centers (e.g., Bermuda). We dropped transactions in these regions from our robustness check to ensure that our empirical results are not driven by transactions in these regions. 11 Charts using different classifications of countries on the BRI will be provided upon request. Details on the different country groups are listed in the Annex in Global Economic Prospects (2018).
Chinese OFDI plays an important role in some EMDEs. Figure 6 shows the top ten Chinese OFDI recipient countries in percentage of GDP. On average, the annual amount of OFDI flow from China to these EMDEs ranges from 1 (Tajikistan) percent of GDP to 3 (Laos) percent, with all the top receivers being BRF participants. Similarly, Chinese OFDI flows account for a large portion of the total FDI net inflows received by some EMDE countries (Figure 7 ). In the top 3 recipient countries (i.e., Afghanistan, Laos, and Central African Republic), more than 50 percent of total FDI net inflows are from China.
Based on the business descriptions recorded in the database, OFDI deals can be grouped into the following 7 industry categories: metal and chemicals, finance and high-tech, mining (including geo-probing activities), construction and infrastructure, manufacturing, trade and related services, and others (including agriculture, culture, food, and forestry). Over the period from 2000-2015,
OFDI deals that focused on trade and related services alone accounted for 33 percent of all OFDI deals, which was 5 percentage points of GDP higher than the amount of OFDI deals from the manufacturing sector ( Figure 8 ). OFDI deals from the construction and infrastructure sector amounted to 18 percent of total OFDI deals and grew more than other sectors after the launch of the BRI. Faster growth in sectors, such as construction and infrastructure, manufacturing, and finance and high-tech sectors, led to changes in the sectoral distribution of OFDI deals after the BRI ( Figure 9 ). As the largest sector of firms investing abroad, deals from trade-related sectors fell from 35.3 percent of all OFDI deals before 2014 to 28.8 percent afterwards. Similar drops occurred in mining and metal and chemical sectors. Such changes in the sectoral distribution of ODI deals before and after 2013 may reflect the rebalancing pattern of the Chinese economy, a plausible driver of the BRI.
Although it was not explicitly mentioned in the BRI, one of the potential objectives of promoting OFDI and the BRI is to address China's domestic overcapacity issue, and thus to help adjust its economic structure (Huang, 2016; Cheng, Dollar and Tang 2015; Pigato and Tang 2015) . Figure 10 plots two production price indices-one for all sectors (PPI: All) and the other for heavy industry alone (PPI: HI)-alongside the number of OFDI deals from the construction sector, which is frequently discussed as one of overcapacity sectors in Chinese economy. 12 As shown in Figure   10 , the cyclical components for PPIs dropped below zero in multiple years, indicating a lack of 12 Mckinsey, 2014, "Rethinking Infrastructure: Voices from the Global Infrastructure Initiative" http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/201801/08/WS5a5318bca31008cf16da5c4a.html;
China Daily, 2018, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/201801/08/WS5a5318bca31008cf16da5c4a.html (accessed on Feb 8, 2018). demand and overcapacity concern. Meanwhile, the number of OFDI deals from the construction sector abruptly reversed the downward trend and jumped up after 2013. The conjecture that more OFDI deals are from overcapacity sectors will be investigated via regressions in Section 6.
Empirical strategy
To empirically test the hypotheses listed in Section 1, we use the following set of pooled data OLS regression models:
= + −1 + + + * + + ;
(2)
where the dependent variable captures the number of OFDI deals going from China to country i recorded in year t. 13 −1 is a vector of control variables that are lagged one year as predetermined variables to address potential endogeneity issues, and is a dummy variable that equals one in and after year 2014. 14 To better capture the degree to which the Chinese government carries out the BRI policy, we also constructed a proxy using the annual number of news articles with "Belt and Road Initiatives" in the title published by People's Daily. We label this measurement People's Daily on the BRI, and make it equal to zero before 2013. A higher value in People's Daily on the BRI indicates that the BRI gains policy importance 15 , and we expect it to have a higher impact on Chinese OFDI. controls for country fixed effects.
is a dummy variable indicating whether country i is a BRI country (= 1) or otherwise (= 0). contains a vector of variables on the domestic economic conditions in China that may "push" firms to invest abroad. To further understand whether "push factors" in China have different impacts on firms' decision to invest abroad before and after the BRI, the interactive term * is added in Eq. (3).
13 Following Cheung et al. (2014) , log transformation is done for the number of OFDI deals. Specifically, it has the following form: = Ln (number of deals from China to country i in year t +1). The transformation reduces the skewness of the raw data and avoids the issue of missing values. 14 Since the BRI was first introduced in September 2013 and it took time for MOFCOM to approve OFDI deals, the BRI is unlikely to make an impact on the number of ODI deals recorded in our database in 2013. Hence, equals one from year 2014 onwards. 15 The BRI was raised for the first time by President Xi Jinping on 7 September 2013. (Source: https://eng.yidaiyilu.gov.cn/ztindex.htm, retrieved on November 30 th , 2017).
Regarding control variables in −1 , we follow existing studies, such as Cheung et al. (2012) , and include variables that capture recipient countries' economic and institutional conditions. First, as suggested by Chen and Tang (2013) and Cheung et al. (2012) , OFDI from China is largely driven by market-and resource-seeking motives. Hence, we include the following variables to proxy for market-and resource-seeking motives. First, Ln(GDP), the recipient country's GDP in current USD (in logs), is commonly used to represent market size (Frankel and Wei, 1996) . Second, Ln(GDPpc), the recipient country's GDP per capita in current USD (in logs), is an indicator of market opportunities (Lipsey, 1999; Kinoshita and Campos, 2003) . Third, Ln(Trade), the commodity trade volume of the recipient country with China in USD (normalized by the recipient country's population and logged), shows the importance of country i as a trading partner with China (Cheung et al. 2012) . Fourth, Energy is a proxy for energy output, including crude oil, natural gas and coal output, and is a composite variable that captures the recipient country's energy output in general. It is normalized by the recipient country's gross national income to facilitate comparison across countries. Data on GDP and energy are obtained from World Development Indicators (WDI, 2016), while trade data are provided by UN Comtrade (2017).
Since institutional quality can affect foreign direct investment (Asiedu 2002 , Cuervo-Cazurra 2006 , Cheung et al. 2012 , and Chen, Dollar and Tang 2015 , four relevant indices are obtained from the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG). They are Bureaucratic quality, Law and order, Corruption, and Investment profile. In all cases, higher value indicates better institutional quality.
For instance, if the Corruption index has a higher value, the recipient country's government is less corrupted.
Relevant "push factors" in China can be grouped into the following three categories: 1) proxies for overcapacity concerns, 2) proxies for China's economic rebalancing needs, and 3) proxies for China's financial/monetary conditions. 16 To measure the extent of industrial overcapacity, we first use the capacity utilization ratio provided by People's Bank of China to measure the rate of equipment utilization. This captures the demand for production equipment. A lower ratio means that Chinese producers need less production equipment than they possess, indicating that the economy has an overcapacity issue. Alternatively, we use the inflation rate of producer price index (PPI; over all sectors) provided by Haver analytics to directly measure overcapacity from the supply side of the Chinese economy. Following the basic supply and demand theory, an increase in supply without an increase in demand results in a decline in producer price. Therefore, a drop of PPI suggests more overcapacity.
In addition to the overcapacity issue, there are increasing concerns about the misalignment of the Chinese economy after its 30 years of high-speed growth, reflected in decreasing economic growth and declining exports. The Chinese economy may need to adjust its economic structure to sustain growth. The BRI may facilitate the process of rebalancing. To test this, we include GDP growth rate and export growth rate in the regressions to check whether the need for rebalancing promotes OFDI.
Furthermore, various variables, such as interest rates to measure domestic credit availability (Shibor: 1-Year (%), provided by Haver analytics), outlook for RMB appreciation (RMB nondeliverable forward rate) and the level of capital controls on OFDI (Chen and Qian, 2016) , are added to measure China's financial/monetary conditions that might push firms to invest abroad.
To accommodate the DID framework, we first use pooled data regression. 17 Due to the issue of cross-sectional dependence 18 and autocorrelation in the error term, we use a pooled data regression with Driscoll and Kraay (1998) standard errors that control for both cross-section correlation and AR(1) autocorrelation.
The data on OFDI deals are left-censored (i. e. , > 0 or =0), with a large portion of the observations being zero. The large amount of zero in our observations could be due to the approval system implemented by MOFCOM (Cheung et al., 2012) . To check whether the potential bias arises because of using left-censored data, we use the panel data Tobit regression model (with random-effect) as a robustness check in the following section. 19 Additionally, OFDI data may subject to time serial data persistency issue in which current OFDI may be affected by previous years' OFDI (Cheng and Kwan, 2000) . Since a panel data regression with lagged dependent variable typically has a data persistency issue, which usually yields biased estimates (Anderson 17 Normally, a fixed effect panel data regression is appropriate for cross-section and cross-time data. However, in a DID regression, a fixed effect regression causes multicollinearity between the fixed effect and the country dummy in DID. Hence, we use pooled data regression first; then we use panel data Tobit and system GMM to check the results' robustness. The results from fixed effect models are consistent with our main findings. 18 Pesaran (2004) cross-section independence test rejects the null. 19 The fixed effect specification would generate biased estimates (Greene, 2004a (Greene, , 2004b ). The Tobit model has the following form:
* is the latent value of the number of OFDI deals or OFDI inflow if the approval system on OFDI did not exist in China. and Hsiao, 1982), we follow Cheng and Kwan (2000) and use dynamic panel system GMM (Generalized Method of Moments).
Another issue with our OFDI data is that it also includes OFDI deals investing in the special territories of China (i.e., Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan, China) and offshore financial centres.
Some of the ODI deals going to these locations involve round-tripping and offshoring (Casanova et al. 2015) , which are usually motivated by different set of factors than normal OFDI deals. As a robustness check, we also drop deals going to the three special territories of China and the offshore financial centres (OFCs) jointly identified by the IMF, the SFI and the OECD (see Appendix Table   A2 for the detailed list).
Empirical results

More OFDI after the launch of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)
Table 1 reports the regression results on the quantitative differences before and after the launch of BRI. We start with a typical OFDI regression, which includes those canonical OFDI determinants such as proxies for firms' market-seeking and resource-seeking motives. As shown in Column [1], we find that host country's market size and its trade ties with China strongly motivate Chinese firms to invest there. In line with the literature (Cheung et al. 2012) , Chinese OFDI went to countries with a poor bureaucratic system, which deters investors from advanced economies and lowers the competition level for Chinese firms.
Then, we add the time dummy variable, BRI, to study how OFDI behaves differently before and after the launch of BRI. To deal with the data and regression issues outlined in the previous section, we report results from pooled data regression, panel data Tobit regression, and dynamic panel data system GMM regression in Columns [2], [3], and [4], respectively, for robustness. The results are generally in line with Column [1] and the findings of other literature papers (Cheung et al. 2012 ). The BRI is found to be significantly associated with Chinese OFDI: averaged across three regressions, Chinese firms invested 45% more OFDI after the launch of BRI than beforehand.
[Insert Table 1 about here] A simple time dummy, BRI, may not be able to capture the variation of the importance of the BRI over time. People's Daily on the BRI, a proxy for the intensity of promotion behind the BRI, is used in Column [5]-[7] to test the importance of BRI to the rise of Chinese OFDI. All coefficients on People's Daily on the BRI are found to be positive and statistically significant at 1 percent. The results suggest that a 1 percent increase in the number of headlines titled with the BRI in People's Daily newspaper leads to a 12 percent increase in the number of OFDI deals from China.
More Chinese OFDI to BRI countries after the BRI?
In this section, we use the difference-in-difference (DID) regression specification, as shown in Eq. (2). The time dummy, BRI, the country dummy, BRC, and their interaction term BRI * BRC are added here. Although China highlighted 65 countries as a part of its BRI (Chin and He 2016) 20 , some of these countries may not necessarily wish to participate in the BRI. Without concrete information about a country's willingness to participate in the BRI, we first use a dummy variable to single out the 65 countries suggested by the Chinese government as countries on the BRI (BRC).
Later, we use an alternative approach to re-categorize countries based on their perceived willingness to participate. [2] show that although the launch of the BRI significantly promotes OFDI, BRI countries are not necessarily receiving more OFDI than others after the launch. Indeed, the coefficient of BRC*BRI is estimated to be negative, albeit insignificant. More interestingly, as listed in Column [3] , in which only AEs samples are used in the regression, AEs covered in the BRI seem to receive significantly less OFDI deals than those not covered in the BRI. A plausible explanation is that OFDI depends on the policy coordination between the home and the host countries. Although some AEs are proposed as BRI countries by China, they may neither wish to actively participate in the BRI nor welcome Chinese OFDI. 21 As Overholt (2015) points out, at least the policy should meet "the need for the host countries to feel … equitably profitable." Without cooperation from these host AEs, the BRI's efforts to promote Chinese OFDI to those countries may turn out to be limited. Thus, it is reasonable that AEs received less OFDI after 2013.
In Column [4], focusing on BRCs in EMDEs yields expected resultswith the impact from BRI, 20% more Chinese OFDI deals went to EMDEs covered in the BRI. In contrast to some AEs, many EMDE BRCs need capital to develop their poor infrastructure. They welcome Chinese firms to invest in their infrastructure sector and hence, they are more willing to economically cooperate with China in the BRI (Hofman, 2016; Huang et al., 2017; Kong, 2017) .
These different results from AEs and EMDEs may partially answer a question raised by Cheng (2016): which of the 60 or so countries in Asia, Europe and Africa along the Belt and Road will likely be the Initiative's priority targets of economic cooperation? Due to the difficulty of working with all 65 countries at the beginning of the BRI, our results seem to suggest that China is strategically putting more priority on EMDEs when promoting the BRI via OFDI.
We now turn to a country categorization that might help reveal countries' willingness to participate in the BRI. To promote the BRI, the Chinese government, led by both President Xi and Premier Li, organized the Belt-and-Road Forum in Beijing (BRF, thereafter) in May 2017, in which 29 heads of state and 28 delegates (at least) at the ministerial level participated. We postulate that participating in BRF reflects countries' willingness to participate in economic cooperation under the BRI (BRF). 22 [Insert Table 2 about here] When countries actively participated in the BRF, we find that the amount of Chinese OFDI deals went up by 64 percent after the launch of the BRI. BRF countries received 60 percent more Chinese OFDI deals than other countries after 2013 (Column [5] ). Estimations without OFCs and China's special territories, AEs, and EMDEs all garner similar results, namely, that the BRI significantly promotes Chinese OFDI deals to BRF countries after 2013. These results are in accordance with the pattern shown in Figure 2 .
In sum, the results are contrasting when comparing estimates using BRC (Columns [1]-[4]) from those using BRF (Columns [5]-[8]) in Table 2 . The estimates using BRF are not only more significant but also substantially greater than those using BRC. In addition, as suggested by adjusting R-squared, models using BRF explain slightly more variation of China's OFDI than those using BRC. These saliently different results may highlight the importance of bilateral cooperation between China and host countries when promoting OFDI.
Domestic push factors and the BRI
The FDI literature usually categorizes FDI deterministic factors into two groups: "push factors" in home countries and "pull factors" in recipient countries. Based on the past discussions on the potential domestic "push" factors that led China to propose the BRI to further promote OFDI, we focus on the following three testable factors: 1, overcapacity concern (proxied by capacity utilization); 2, China's economic rebalancing needs (measured by exports growth or GDP growth rate); and 3, China's financial/monetary conditions (measured by borrowing cost, capital controls, and expectation of RMB exchange rate). The proxies for these push factors are added in model Eq.
1 one by one, and the results are reported in Table 3 .
[Insert Table 3 about here] As shown in Table 3 , from 2000 to 2015, neither export growth nor GDP growth has a significant coefficient. This suggests that the needs of economic rebalancing have no impact on China's OFDI behaviour. Domestic financing cost does not contribute to Chinese OFDI, either. It seems that it is not new for China to address overcapacity issue using the OFDI approach, as we estimate "Capacity utilization" as positive and significant at the 10% level. A higher level of capital controls on OFDI reduces OFDI, as the expectation of RMB appreciation is linked with lower OFDI.
Does the BRI change how those push factors affect Chinese OFDI, as some scholars argued (Huang, 2017; Yu, 2017) ? We approach this question by including the interaction terms between the dummy variable, BRI, with those relevant domestic push factors in Table 3 . If Chinese firms are responding to the government's initiative, the impact of domestic push factors on China's OFDI should strengthen after the launch of BRI. Indeed, Table 4 shows that a 1% reduction in capacity utilization (high level of overcapacity) is associated with 0.34% more OFDI deals after 2013.
[Insert Table 4 about here]
In this instance, both export growth and GDP growth are found to have significant coefficients, which supports the argument that the BRI may serve China's rebalancing needs. The results also show that Chinese OFDI reacted to the economic slowdown in China quite strongly after 2013. A 1% drop in Chinese GDP growth rate is linked with a 1.34% increase in the number of OFDI deals after the launch of the BRI. Similarly, but in a lesser manner, a 0.04% increase in OFDI is associated with a 1% decrease in exports from China.
Higher domestic financing costs (less credit availability) reduce Chinese OFDI. This, in some sense, reflects the importance of establishing the Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) to manage the financing cost for the BRI OFDI project (Gabusi, 2017) . Capital controls on OFDI show no significant association with the number of ODI deals from 2014 onwards, while the high propensity for RMB depreciation is found to be associated with more OFDI deals after 2013. The latter hints a situation in which some Chinese firms take advantage of the BRI and disguise their capital outflow as OFDI deals to hedge against RMB depreciation. 23
Robustness checks
Other definitions of BRI countries
In this section, we gather four other plausible sets of countries on the BRI (shown in Appendix Table A1 ) to check the robustness of our results. These alternative definitions of countries on the BRI are either associated with an institution, appear in reports by some well-known think tanks or are shown on some influential websites. The results are shown in Table 5 .
[Insert Table 5 about here] Following Chin and He (2016) , countries are classified as those that are on the BRI (labelled as Fung [on]) and those that are interested in joining the BRI (Fung [in]). Dummies for these two group of countries are included here. The results echo those in Section 5: countries that expressed interest in joining the BRI receive significantly more OFDI deals than others after the launch of the BRI (Column [2] of Table 5 ), whereas countries on the BRI list receive less Chinese OFDIs (Column [1] ). As the most important financing partner of the BRI, the results show that the Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) helped its members to receive significantly more OFDI deals after the launch of the BRI. Finally, using the list of BRI countries defined on Wikipedia, we find that the number of OFDI deals going to BRI countries increases by 37 percent after 2013. In sum, our main results are robust when using alternative country lists of the BRI.
Size of OFDI flow
Despite the advantages of using Chinese OFDI deal data for our empirical exercises, there is a caveat that information on the investment amount of OFDI deals is unavailable. To overcome the limitation to the greatest extent possible, we redo all the regressions shown in Table 2 using the annual OFDI flow (in millions of USD) from China to recipient countries and report the results in Table 6 . Consistent with the previous section, we used the dummy, BRC, in Columns [3] -[6], and the dummy, BRF, in Columns [7] - [9] . The dependent variable is the logarithm of aggregated OFDI flow in millions of USD. The same set of subsamples used in Table 2 are applied here to test whether the finding is consistent across country groups.
In general, the BRI significantly promotes Chinese OFDI flows to the rest of the world. Like the results in Section 5, the impact of BRI on Chinese OFDI volume depends on the willingness of host countries to participate in the BRI. For countries that are willing to participate (BRF), the BRI promotes 12% more Chinese OFDI by value than those that are not interested in the BRI (Columns [7] -[9]). In contrast, the BRI do not serve the BRC sample (especially the AEs) well in terms of attracting OFDI volume, which confirms the results in Section 5 that the BRI might give the priority to BRI EMDEs. Column [6] further suggests that the launch of BRI promotes 6% more Chinese OFDI flows to BRI EMDEs than to others.
[Insert Table 6 about here]
Central SOEs
Here, we study how firms with different ownership structures react to the BRI differently. The results are displayed in [6] . While central SOEs tend to invest more in countries with a large market, other enterprises invest more in countries that have a strong trade tie with China and are rich in energy resources. Moreover, it seems that central SOEs prefer countries with poorer institutions more than other enterprises. The results shown in Table 7 are largely in line with those in Table 2 .
[Insert Table 7 about here] When comparing the coefficients before BRI, we find that private enterprises engaged in more OFDI deals (approximately 17 percent) after 2013 than central SOEs. Central SOEs follow government policies more closely than private enterprises. As suggested in Column [3], the BRI push significantly more OFDI from central SOEs (10%) to countries emphasized by the Chinese government (BRC). Private enterprises seem to examine the host counties' attitude towards the BRI more in regard to their OFDI decisions: they make 68% more OFDI deals in countries that are willing to participate in the BRI (i.e., BRF participants, Column [6]) while showing no increase in their investment tendency in regard to the BRI countries suggested by the Chinese government (Column [4] ).
Various industrial sectors
In Table 8 , we first test whether firms from certain industrial sectors invest more after the launch of the BRI than other sectors and then examine whether they invest more in countries that are BRF participants. The number of OFDI deals made by firms from various industries is used as the dependent variable here. The results show that firms from all industries increase their investment abroad significantly after 2013, especially in construction-and-infrastructure sector, the manufacturing sector, and the trade-and-related service sector. In particular, the median number of deals in a country's construction sector raised from below 1 per year before the launch of BRI to 2 per year afterwards 24 . The launch of BRI alone is associated with about 80 percent of the increase in the number of construction deals.
Additionally, BRI participants receive more OFDI deals from all industries than other host countries after the launch of the BRI. Particularly, the deals from the construction-andinfrastructure sector, the manufacturing sector, and the trade-and-related service sector increased in BRF participating countries by 80-120 percent after the launch of the BRI; whereas the increase in non-BRF participating countries is about 17-57 percent. As a joint result of other contributing factors and the launch of BRI, the median number of deals in the construction sector of a BRF participating country rose from 0 per year to 6 per year after the launch of BRI. In contrast, the median number of OFDI deals in the construction sector of a non-BRF participating country rose from 0 per year to 1 per year.
[Insert Table 8 and 9 about here] There are debates on the production overcapacity issue associated with some industrial sectors in China (e.g., construction, infrastructure, and manufacturing sector). We attempt to assess the association between overcapacity in a certain sector and the BRI's impact on promoting OFDI to that sector. A positive association suggests that the BRI directs Chinese OFDI to address the overcapacity issue. China's production price index (PPI) is used to measure the level of overcapacitya lower PPI indicates a higher level of overcapacity. Table 9 reports results for six major industries. The results suggest that across all industrial sectors, rising production overcapacity is associated with more OFDI deals after the launch of the BRI. However, this association is substantially stronger in the construction-and-infrastructure and manufacturing sectors than in other sectors. Because these sectors are highlighted as the sectors associated with production overcapacity issues, the BRI seems to direct Chinese firms to export domestic production capacity to correct the worsening overcapacity situation in some industries, which some scholars have suggested is a motive for the BRI (Huang, 2016; Kong, 2017) .
Concluding remarks
After the announcement of the BRI, there has been a plethora of debates on the possible underlying causes of the initiate and its potential economic impact on China, the countries mapped under the BRI, and the global economy. In this study, we collect OFDI deal (and aggregate volume) data from MOFCOM to quantitively gauge the impact of the BRI on Chinese firm's OFDI pattern.
We attempt to answer the following questions: Does the BRI promote Chinese OFDI (especially in BRI countries)? Does the BRI alter the effect of domestic push factors on Chinese OFDI behaviour? Does the BRI's impact OFDI differ across industrial sectors and different ownership structures? Various regression methods (e.g., Tobit regression and the dynamic panel data system GMM approach) are used to insure robustness.
We find that the BRI significantly promotes Chinese OFDI deals: on average, Chinese firms made approximately 45% more OFDI deals after the launch of the BRI. The magnitude of the initiative's impact on OFDI also depends on the willingness of host countries to participate in the BRI. When actively participating in the BRI (i.e., attending the BRF), these countries receive 60% more Chinese OFDI deals after the launch of the BRI. In addition, the results suggest that the BRI gives priority to emerging markets and developing countries (EMDEs) covered by the BRI.
There is empirical evidence that Chinese OFDI may help address domestic economic issues (e.g., production overcapacity), which was argued as one of the incentives for China to promote the BRI. The results show that Chinese OFDI deals increase more in industrial sectors with overcapacity issues. As the main vehicle for the Chinese government to pursue its economic plans, central SOEs are more responsive to the BRI in terms of investing abroad. Private enterprises will also base their OFDI decisions on the host countries' willingness to participate in the BRI while taking advantage of the BRI.
While our results are robust to different definitions of BRI countries, our results suffer from a few caveats that are mainly associated with the OFDI deal data we use. First, the OFDI deal data are from 2000 to 2015, which provide us with only two years of observations of the BRI. Data availability limits our analysis on the long-term impact of the BRI on Chinese OFDI. Second, the OFDI deal data do not contain the monetary value of each OFDI deal. This forces us to treat all OFDI deals the same regardless of their investment size. We do, however, back up our results with additional analyses using aggregate OFDI volume data. Figure 2 , the period after the announcement of the Belt and Road initiatives (BRI) is highlighted by the grey shade. The red line shows the annual number of OFDI deals on the right-hand side (in thousands of deals), while the blue line shows the annual volume of OFDI (in billions of USD) on the left-hand side. Figure 3 shows the number of OFDI deals (in 1,000s) received by advanced economies (AE) and emerging markets and developing economies (EMDE) before and after the BRI is launched. "Before 2013" includes 2013. Note: The dependent variable is ln(number of OFDI deals+1). The same log transformation is done for "Ppl's Daily on BRI", which captures the number of articles with BRI in their titles. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Pooled: pooled data regressions controlling for both cross-section correlation and AR(1) autocorrelation in the error term. Tobit: censored panel data Tobit regression. GMM: dynamic panel data regressions controlling for lagged dependent variable, weak exogeneity, and autocorrelation. Note: the table reports regression results from pooled data regressions controlling for both cross-section correlation and AR(1) autocorrelation in the error term. The dependent variable is ln(number of OFDI deals+1). Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. "Capacity utilization" is demeaned data for percentage of equipment utilization; "Capital control" is a de jure measurement for the Chinese government's control of outward FDI (Chen and Qian, 2016) ; "Outlook of RMB" shows the expectation of the RMB exchange rate, measured as RMB/USD. results from pooled data regressions controlling for both cross-section correlation and AR(1) autocorrelation in the error term. The dependent variable is ln(number of OFDI deals+1). Robust S.E. in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<01. "Capacity utilization" is demeaned data for percentage of equipment utilization; "Capital control" is a de jure measurement for the Chinese government's control of outward FDI (Chen and Qian, 2016) ; "Outlook of RMB" shows the expectation of the RMB exchange rate, measured as RMB/USD. 0.25*** 0.23*** 0.12*** 0.12*** 0.35*** 0.31*** 0.14*** 0.13*** 0.16*** 0.15*** 0.38*** 0.34*** (0.06) (0.05) (0.03) (0.03) (0.06) (0.05) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.06) (0.05) Ln(GDPpc)t-1 -0.07 -0.05 -0.05* -0.05** -0.19** -0.16** -0.08** -0.07** -0.09* -0.08 -0.14** -0.12* (0.07) (0.06) (0.02) (0.02) (0.08) (0.07) (0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.05) (0.07) (0.06) Ln(Trade)t-1 0.01 0.01 0.00* 0.00* 0.02** 0.02** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01** 0.01** 0.01* 0.01* (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) Energyt-1 0.01*** 0.01*** -0.00* -0.00* 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) Bureaucratic qualityt-1 -0.17*** -0.17*** -0.01 -0.01 -0.06 -0.06 -0.02 -0.02 -0.06** -0.06** -0.10** -0.10** (0.03) (0 Table A1 for list of countries that participated in BR forum. Investment deals that cannot be grouped into industries that are listed above have been classified as "Other" and dropped. The results from "Other" are in line with the main results shown in Table 8 and will be provided upon request. 
